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TRIBAL DATA GOVERNANCE AND INFORMATIONAL
PRIVACY: CONSTRUCTING “INDIGENOUS
DATA SOVEREIGNTY”
Rebecca Tsosie*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing movement among Indigenous peoples to assert a
right to “Indigenous data sovereignty,” and yet, the term “data sovereignty”
is not widely understood. What does it mean to control the collection, use
and management of information in an era of “Big Data,” in which digital
technology transforms knowledge into electronic form, to be freely used
and traded, and, sometimes even commodified? More importantly, what are
the interests of Native nations and other Indigenous peoples in these topics?
Is political status tied to governance authority? If so, who controls the terms
of data sovereignty—the Indigenous nation or the nation-state?
Proponents of Indigenous data sovereignty assert that Native nations
and other Indigenous peoples ought to control the collection and use of data
by and about them, and they link this normative claim to political and moral
claims of “self-determination.”1 There is clearly a basic need for tribal gov-
ernance authority over information about the tribes, their resources, and
their members, but there are also considerable challenges that must be con-
sidered.2 Specifically, there are various meanings that could attach to an
assertion of data sovereignty, and each of these has different implications.
For example, by defining a group interest in data about tribal members,
such as educational attainment or health disparities, there is a concomitant
concern to protect the rights of the tribal members—who possess individual
* Regents’ Professor of Law, University of Arizona and Faculty Co-Chair, Indigenous Peoples’
Law and Policy Program. The author would like to thank her colleagues at the University of Arizona,
Dr. Stephanie Rainie and Desi Rodriguez Lonebear for their leadership on the issue of data sovereignty
for Indigenous peoples. This essay builds on their insights and important work and contributes a legal
analysis of the issues. I am also very grateful for the thoughtful comments of Professor Andrew Woods
and Professor Bethany Sullivan, my faculty colleagues at the UA College of Law. Finally, I would like
to thank the editors and staff of the University of Montana Law Review for sponsoring a Symposium on
“The Future of Indian Law” and inviting me to present my research on Indigenous Data Sovereignty.
The discussion with UM faculty and conference participants greatly assisted the development of this
essay, and Kirsi Luther and the MLR staff provided outstanding editorial support.
1. See Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Preface, in INDIGENOUS DATA SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARD AN AGENDA
xxi, xxi–xxii (Tahu Kukutai & John Taylor eds., 2016). This volume is the most comprehensive re-
source to date on Indigenous Data Sovereignty and is heavily cited in this essay.
2. Id. at xxi–xxii.
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rights—such as the right to privacy.3 Furthermore, the data about tribal
members is often housed within repositories operated by federal or state
agencies. The data is gathered according to the priorities of those agencies,
and access is determined by the rules of those governments.4 These rules
might well protect the privacy interests of named individuals. However,
they are far less likely to protect a tribe’s collective interest in exercising
control over the use and disposition of the data or remediating harm that
arises from the release of data to third parties.5
Some scholars have drawn a distinction between “data sovereignty”
and “data governance.6 Data sovereignty describes the right of a nation to
“govern the collection, ownership and application of data”7 concerning the
tribe or its members and to control data that is housed within tribal territory.
Data governance,8 on the other hand, refers to a tribal government’s right to
control the use or reuse of tribal data by third parties, even if the data was
gathered in the context of earlier research studies.9 In the latter case, the
term “tribal data” would be invoked to describe categories of information
subject to tribal rights of ownership and control, allowing the tribe to in-
clude or exclude others from access to the data.10 This is important because,
as some analysts have noted, “data are people too.”11 For example, a health
study of diabetes among tribal members requires researchers to take physi-
cal samples from participants, as well as information about his or her family
members and lifestyle choices, such as diet and exercise habits.12 The
health information is associated with the person, and, even if the data is
“de-identified” in the future to meet privacy restrictions, that information is
the person.13 For this reason, the tribal government has a strong interest in
3. C. Matthew Snipp, What Does Data Sovereignty Imply: What Does it Look Like?, in INDIGE-
NOUS DATA SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARD AN AGENDA 39, 48 (Tahu Kukutai & John Taylor eds., 2016).
4. Id. at 46–47.
5. Id. at 48–49 (discussing cases where this occurred).
6. Professor Stephanie Carroll Rainie, one of the leading proponents of Indigenous data sover-
eignty, draws this distinction. Stephanie C. Rainie et al., Data as a Strategic Resource for Self-Determi-
nation, Governance and the Data Challenge for Indigenous Nations in the United States, 8 INT’L INDIG-
ENOUS POL’Y J., 1, 5–6 (2017).
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Tahu Kukutai & John Taylor, Data sovereignty for indigenous peoples: current practice and
future needs, in INDIGENOUS DATA SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARD AN AGENDA 1, 7 (Tahu Kukutai & John
Taylor eds., 2016).
11. Joanna Radin, “Digital Natives”: How Medical and Indigenous Histories Matter for Big Data,
32 OSIRIS 43, 62 (2017) (referring to comments by Rebecca Lemov and Dan Bouk).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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exercising its sovereignty to protect the interests of its members, and some
tribal leaders might even consider this a sacred responsibility.14
The discourse about Indigenous data sovereignty demonstrates that tri-
bal governments are seeking a corrective for past wrongs, as well as to
develop a more equitable structure of data governance for the future.15 The
existing legal and policy frameworks for data governance, however, are
rooted in the same power structures that inform national and international
decision-making. Indigenous peoples do not have the same standing as na-
tion-states to control the acquisition and use of information at the national
and global levels.16 On the other hand, federally-recognized tribal govern-
ments do possess the authority to enact laws at the tribal level. Although
jurisdictional limitations may exist, tribal laws can help inform analogous
federal and state policies governing data, for example, by defining what
constitutes “tribal data” and what would be appropriate ways to secure tri-
bal consent to collection, use or disposition of such data.
This essay discusses tribal claims to data sovereignty and informa-
tional privacy, examining the nature of the respective claims, as well as
how tribal governments can exercise effective authority over the collection
and use of data about the community and its members. This is a complex
and multifaceted inquiry, and this essay provides only an initial analysis for
consideration. As Kukatai and Taylor note, Indigenous data sovereignty
raises “a wide-ranging set of issues, from legal and ethical dimensions
around data storage, ownership, access and consent, to intellectual property
rights and practical considerations about how data are used in the context of
research, policy and practice.”17  The issues are raised, in part, because of
past research misconduct that harmed Indigenous peoples and their mem-
bers.18 The main purpose of this essay is to identify the legal principles that
control data governance within domestic and international law and explore
how tribal sovereignty is impacted by these principles and their associated
policies. This essay argues for a critical look at the structures for data gov-
ernance and the need for intergovernmental cooperation between tribal, fed-
eral and state governments and their agencies. Governance of emerging
technologies presents new challenges for governments throughout the
14. Desi Rodriguez-Lonebear, Building a Data Revolution in Indian Country, in INDIGENOUS DATA
SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARD AN AGENDA 253, 268 (Tahu Kukutai & John Taylor eds., 2016) (citing inter-
view with a tribal leader).
15. Kukutai & Taylor, supra note 10, at 4–5. R
16. Id. at 1–3.
17. Id. at 2.
18. See infra notes 213–21 and accompanying text (discussing the claim of the Havasupai Tribe
and its members against Arizona State University and the Arizona Board of Regents in connection with
the unauthorized use of physical samples and other data taken from tribal members for use in a diabetes
study, as well as a similar case involving an Indigenous nation in British Columbia).
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world, necessitating cooperation and collective action.19 Tribal govern-
ments within the United States are poised to become leaders in the par-
ticipatory design of more fair and effective governance structures for digital
data.
Part I of the essay explores the issue of data sovereignty compara-
tively, framing the concept within its global and national contexts, and then
discussing the rights of tribal governments and other Indigenous peoples.
Part II of the essay examines the various claims that are comprised within
the movement toward “Indigenous data sovereignty,” as well as the current
context of data governance by tribal governments. Part III of the essay dis-
cusses three substantive areas of research that test out the reach of these
principles. The essay concludes with recommendations for actions that tri-
bal governments can take to enhance their ability to exercise governance
authority over their data.
II. DATA SOVEREIGNTY: NATIONAL, GLOBAL, AND TRIBAL
The principle of territorial sovereignty is paramount within interna-
tional law and secures the right of nation-states to exercise exclusive gov-
ernance authority over matters within their territory.20 Within the United
States, tribal governments exercise sovereignty over their reservation and
other trust lands, and, in some ways, they have an analogous status to for-
eign nations.21 Tribal governments preexisted the United States, and they
are not part of the constitutional compact that governs the federal govern-
ment and the states.22 In fact, many tribal nations have treaties with the
United States, and the treaties recognize the sovereign status of Native na-
tions, as well as their territorial boundaries.23 Even today, tribal reservation
lands are jurisdictionally distinct from the states that now encompass them.
For this reason, Indigenous data sovereignty is best understood within the
context of United States Federal Indian law and the construction of tribal
sovereignty, as well as international human rights law and the construction
of the rights of Indigenous peoples.
19. This point was made by Dr. Katina Michaels, Professor at ASU’s School for the Future of
Innovation in Society, at a recent conference on Governance of Emerging Technologies and Sciences in
the opening panel entitled “Technology: The End of Democracy?” which detailed the massive scale of
governance challenges raised by technologies such as Artificial Intelligence. Beus Center for Law and
Society, Phoenix, AZ (May 22, 2019).
20. See Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural
Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 192 (2011)
(discussing the central principles of the tribal sovereignty doctrine within Federal Indian law).
21. Id. at 192–93.
22. Id. at 192.
23. Id. at 192.
4
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A. Data Sovereignty and Nation-States
At the international level, “data sovereignty” means “managing infor-
mation in a way that is consistent with the laws, practices and customs of
the nation-state in which it is located.”24 As Professor Andrew Woods
points out, nation-states exercise their sovereignty by controlling data
within their territory, particularly in association with the physical infrastruc-
ture used to house data.25 The United States Government, for example, con-
trols the nation’s physical network architecture, including the fiber optic
cables, servers, and computers within its territory.26 By virtue of its physi-
cal access to fiber optic cables, the National Security Agency can surveil
internet traffic as part of its “upstream program.”27
National governments exercise data sovereignty in various ways, in-
cluding to censor offensive content, monitor online activity, and bar access
by other sovereigns.28 What data sovereignty looks like in a given country
reflects that nation’s norms and values, and, not surprisingly, there are
marked differences among nations.29 The interaction of sovereign govern-
ments with private companies also influences the issue of data govern-
ance.30 Private companies, such as Google, tend to dominate the global
economy, and they do business in many nations.31 Data sovereignty means
that a particular country, such as China, can require companies to abide by
local law as a condition of doing business in its markets.32 In fact, China
requires companies to provide the state with physical access to their data.33
The nation-state therefore controls the people and the property as it ad-
ministers access to the data.34
When a nation-state seeks to regulate private companies by requiring
access to data (for example, in an association with its effort to find evidence
for a criminal prosecution), the state can enjoin the company from operating
its business within national borders until it complies.35 Because American
companies tend to dominate the global market, they endorse data policy
24. Snipp, supra note 3, at 39. R
25. Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328, 361–62 (2018).
26. Id. at 361.
27. Craig Timberg, NSA Slide Shows Surveillance of Undersea Cables, WASH. POST, Jul. 10,
2013, https://perma.cc/76TW-3W89.
28. Woods, supra note 25, at 361. R
29. Snipp, supra note 3, at 39–40. R
30. Id.
31. Woods, supra note 25, at 361. R
32. Id. at 361–62.
33. Snipp, supra note 3, at 40; Miguel Helft & David Barboza, Google Shuts China Site in Dispute R
Over Censorship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, https://perma.cc/98F3-D4PH.
34. Snipp, supra note 3, at 40; Helft & Barboza, supra note 33.
35. Woods, supra note 25, at 362–63. R
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norms favoring free speech, privacy, and entrepreneurship.36 Due to the
digital nature of information technology, however, the rules governing data
in one jurisdiction are likely to collide with the rules that apply in other
jurisdictions.37 In these cases, courts must give mutual recognition and def-
erence to each sovereign, perhaps balancing interests or applying the doc-
trine of comity.38
As Professor Woods notes with respect to internet governance, there
are two competing visions of data governance that operate today.39 The
“cosmopolitan ideal” endorses maximum freedom and an “open internet”
governed by a global set of rules that would apply uniformly throughout the
world.40 The “sovereign-difference” ideal, on the other hand, supports the
notion that the internet should continue to operate  in accordance with local
norms, customs and rules.41 The differences among countries are notable in
the area of hate speech, where most countries favor regulating extreme con-
tent, and the “United States is on its own when it comes to managing vio-
lent and racist speech online.”42 The United States endorses the cosmopoli-
tan ideal because it serves the values of autonomy and freedom of speech.
The justification for the sovereign difference ideal is linked to the interna-
tional law norm requiring deference to a sovereign nation’s authority within
its territory. While the United States benefits locally from this principle, the
sovereign difference ideal also requires respect for the more restrictive poli-
cies favored by many other nations.
According to Professor Woods, the idea that sovereignty is an overrid-
ing principle of international law requiring deference in all cases is not suf-
ficient to justify local control.43 A more refined argument, he posits, would
be that “data is just another globally distributed good” and, therefore,
should be subject to the general rules of international law, including sover-
eign deference.44 However, Professor Woods claims that the strongest argu-
ment is that sovereign deference “represents the best possible hope for
global governance of the internet” because it encourages governments to
negotiate with one another and facilitate mutual cooperation, rather than
fragmentation.45
36. Id. at 367–68.
37. Id. at 367–69.
38. Id. at 371–73.
39. Id. at 367.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 367–68.
42. Cecilia Kang, Can Tech Companies Silence Hate Speech?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2019, at B1.
43. Woods, supra note 25, at 386–94. R
44. Id. at 371.
45. Id.
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The doctrine of comity encourages cooperation among sovereigns, and
there is a powerful interface between comity and the sovereign-difference
ideal.46 Broadly speaking, Professor Woods offers several examples where
interjurisdictional cooperation is needed to regulate data: (1) where the law
enforcement agency within one jurisdiction seeks access to data stored in
another jurisdiction; (2) where the government has issued a take-down or-
der for extremist content, for example, a website containing hate speech in
countries where such speech is unlawful or posting graphic photos that
jeopardize privacy rights or public decency; and (3) where the government
seeks to delist or delink content that violates intellectual property rights.47
In each of these cases, the government is regulating data as informa-
tion in the exercise of its national authority.48 The sovereign-difference
principle can be invoked in cases of interjurisdictional conflict, but natu-
rally, this requires nation-states to work cooperatively to resolve the conflict
because each set of rules is valid and accorded deference.49
As the next section of this essay demonstrates, these issues and princi-
ples are also potentially useful in the construction of “Indigenous data sov-
ereignty,” at least with respect to federally-recognized tribal governments in
the United States. At a foundational level, tribal governments exercise juris-
diction over their territory, inclusive of their reservation and other trust
lands.50 Like all governments, tribal governments seek access to the internet
and mobile phone technology for members living on the reservation, and
these technologies provide very useful methods to harness data.51 Data is
commonly gathered and shared through mobile phone applications, for ex-
ample, but it is unclear how this should occur for consumers living on a
reservation.52 The analogy to taxation of internet purchases gives one view
of the complex challenges. Typically, states cannot tax tribal members for
purchases made on the reservation.53 However, if the member makes a
purchase on Amazon from his or her computer on the reservation, the state
sales tax may be assessed by virtue of the tribal member’s postal zip code.54
There is currently no way to sort this out using the standard online technol-
ogy, and the jurisdictional rules, although applicable, are likely not enforce-
able.
46. Id. at 372–73.
47. Id. at 339–47.
48. Id. at 355–56.
49. Id. at 359.
50. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 20, at 192–93. R
51. Snipp, supra note 3, at 51. R
52. Id.
53. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
54. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
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In addition, Indigenous data sovereignty has an important intersection
with cultural preservation efforts. Tribal governments often have cultural
concerns about placing sensitive information into databases that are accessi-
ble to the public.55 Their understanding of what images and information are
inappropriate to be shared relate to their distinctive histories, legal systems,
and customary norms.56 Tribal legal systems may embody very different
understandings of what constitutes “property” and how tangible and intan-
gible items relating to cultural heritage should be treated. These issues are
currently under active consideration in meetings of the Intergovernmental
Committee of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which
is considering treaty protection for the categories of Indigenous traditional
knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, and genetic resources.57 These
are all areas where tribal customary law frequently reflects different rules
than western intellectual property-rights systems, such as copyright and pat-
ent. For this reason, WIPO is contemplating a sui generis form of protection
for the rights of Indigenous peoples and, perhaps, for other local communi-
ties.58
Because the legal claims of federally-recognized tribal governments in
the United States differ from non-recognized groups, it is necessary to un-
derstand the nature of tribal sovereignty within the United States federal
system before exploring the nature of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-de-
termination under international human rights law.
B. The Nature of Tribal Sovereignty
American Indian and Alaska Native Nations within the United States
exercise inherent sovereignty over their members and their territory. Feder-
ally-recognized tribal governments have the capacity to enact laws gov-
erning tribal lands and resources, including informational resources, and
most have judicial systems to adjudicate civil and criminal cases. Because
the inherent sovereign authority of tribal governments is more like that of
foreign nations, state courts often invoke the principle of comity to give
55. See Jane Anderson, Access and Control of Indigenous Knowledge in Libraries and Archives:
Ownership and Future Use, American Library Association and The MacArthur Foundation, Columbia
University, New York, May 2005 at 15–17, https://perma.cc/P4PK-LMVE (discussing the concerns of
Indigenous peoples about information stored in public archives).
56. See Id., at 3 (discussing perspective of an Aboriginal leader in Australia).
57. See generally PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: THE WIPO INTERGOVERNMENTAL COM-
MITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLK-
LORE (Daniel F. Robinson, Ahmed Abdel-Latif, & Pedro Roffe eds., 2017)
58. Id.
8
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effect to tribal court judgments and orders.59 Many tribal governments en-
tered treaties with the United States Government that recognize their sover-
eignty over their territory.60 State governments generally must abide by
those treaties to serve process in Indian country or to extradite a criminal
suspect residing in Indian country.61 Today, tribal governments retain their
treaty rights, and they also have the authority to enter intergovernmental
agreements with state governments and federal agencies to manage shared
resources, such as forests and watersheds.62 Tribal, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies routinely enter intergovernmental agreements to man-
age their mutual interest in protecting public safety.63 These principles sup-
port the notion that tribal governments can exercise sovereignty over data
stored within their territory, as well as data about their members, lands, or
resources. To the extent that tribal data becomes a “shared resource” be-
tween state or federal governments, or even multiple tribal governments,
however, principles of tribal sovereignty would appear to require a negoti-
ated co-management agreement for the database, honoring any relevant re-
strictions for tribal data.
Federally-recognized tribal governments are in a trust relationship with
the United States. The United States Congress has the power to enact laws
to protect tribal governments in their exercise of self-government, and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service operate specific pro-
grams to assist tribal governments and tribal members. Reservation lands
are generally held in trust by the federal government, although there can be
non-Indian fee land on the reservation due to the allotment policy of the
nineteenth century and early twentieth century.64 The tribal government is
the beneficial owner of its trust land, and it is also the presumptive govern-
ment with the authority to regulate lands within the reservation.65 Reserva-
tion lands are typically subject to federal and tribal law, and state govern-
ments generally lack authority to regulate within Indian country, except in
cases where they have a sufficient interest to justify a particular form of
regulation, such as taxation of cigarette sales to non-Indian state residents.66
59. E.g., Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 810 P.2d 1030, 1041 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc)
(applying principle of comity to recognize Navajo Nation’s enactment of the Uniform Law to Secure
Witnesses from Outside Jurisdiction).
60. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 20, at 192. R
61. E.g., State of Ariz. ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 1969).
62. See Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the “Public Trust” and the “Indian Trust” Doc-
trines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271, 309–10 (2003).
63. Id.
64. See generally Judy Royster, The Legacy of the Allotment Act, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
65. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2723 (citing Strate
v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997)).
66. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832) (holding that state of Georgia could not
extend its laws to the Cherokee Nation’s territory); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1959)
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Tribal governments generally regulate reservation lands, although they may
lack authority to regulate non-Indian-owned fee land on the reservation.67
The United States Supreme Court has determined that tribal governments
can exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee land, but only when
they are in a consensual relationship with the tribe or its members, or when
such exercise would be “necessary to protect tribal self-government or in-
ternal relations.”68
Given these jurisdictional complexities, the exercise of data sover-
eignty by federally-recognized tribal governments must be considered with
respect to the sovereign-difference principle that pertains to data govern-
ance among nation-states. However, it should be noted that, within the
United States, the exercise of Indigenous data sovereignty could trigger in-
terests of the federal and state governments. Tribal governments are subject
to the overriding interests of the United States Government represented by
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.69 Congress regu-
lates interstate commerce, foreign affairs, national security, and trans-
boundary resources, such as navigable waterways.70 Congress also regu-
lates information technology through the Federal Communications Act, due
to its interstate nature, and the Federal Communications Commission im-
plements this law.71 As such, tribal governments are preempted from regu-
lating information technology in ways that would violate federal law. How-
ever, tribal governments have a fair amount of autonomy to legislate in
areas where they are not preempted by federal law.
Tribal governments are also protected by the federal trust responsibil-
ity, which is intended to secure tribal rights to self-governance.72 The fed-
eral government’s trust duty could be construed to extend to the protection
(holding that the basic policy of Worcester continues and that owner of Indian trading post must use
courts of Navajo Nation to sue a tribal member for defaulting on a debt and could not file action in
Arizona state court); but see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 156–57 (1980) (holding that state of Washington can impose sales tax on reservation sales of
cigarettes to non-Indians because state has interest in taxing such sales and the tax does not “unnecessa-
rily” intrude upon tribal interests).
67. E.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–65 (1981) (holding that Crow Tribe could
not regulate hunting and fishing by non-members on fee land within the reservation, although it had this
right with respect to tribal trust land and allotments in Indian ownership).
68. Id. at 564–66.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376,
384 (1896) (holding that the Bill of Rights does not apply to tribal governments, but that they are
“restrained by the general provisions of the Constitution of the United States”).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824) (holding Congress has
the power to regulate interstate commerce, factual dispute over navigable waterway between two states).
71. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934), re-enacted with amendments Tele-
communications Act of 1996 47 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1996) (enacted “for the purpose of regulating inter-
state and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio”).
72. E.g., Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
10
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of data in the possession of federal agencies that concerns tribal govern-
ments and their members. For example, in Utah v. United States Depart-
ment of Interior,73 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a federal dis-
trict court ruling protecting key terms of a lease between the Skull Valley
Band of Goshute Indians and a group of utility companies from disclosure
under the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).74 In this case, the
lease allowed the companies to store 40,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel on
tribal land. The BIA had approved the lease and, upon the State’s request,
provided a redacted copy of the lease.75 The State appealed, seeking full
disclosure of the lease terms, and the federal courts denied this request on
the basis of the FOIA exemption protecting “trade secrets and commercial
or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confiden-
tial.”76 However, the lines on this are not always clear. Third parties have a
right to access federal agency data under  FOIA, unless it falls into a pro-
tected category of information that provides a privilege against discovery
(such as attorney work-product) or is specifically excluded by a statutory
exemption.77 The Supreme Court has held that there is no categorical exclu-
sion for information obtained through the federal-tribal trust relationship.78
Additionally, many Indigenous groups are not protected by the federal
trust responsibility, such as state-recognized tribes that lack federal recogni-
tion and non-recognized tribes that seek federal and/or state recognition.
Indigenous peoples who lack federal recognition also lack the ability to
make laws and apply them to a trust territory. They are also unlikely to have
the authority to protect the interests of tribal members to the extent that
these interests are separate and distinct from the interests of all citizens
(such as privacy) and assuming that the federal or state government is un-
willing to extend the rules that are applicable to federally-recognized tribal
governments.79
Within the United States, Indigenous data sovereignty is complicated
by these variations in the political and legal status of the respective groups.
Although this essay focuses on the rights of federally-recognized tribes, I
acknowledge that there are multiple issues that affect Indigenous peoples
generally, and federally-recognized tribes currently are in the strongest po-
73. 256 F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 2001).
74. Id. at 971.
75. Id. at 968.
76. Id. at 969.
77. See Dept. of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 121 S. Ct. 1060, 1065 (2001)
(holding that records in this case did not fit within exemption for “inter-agency” or “intra-agency”
memorandums or letters).
78. Id. at 1069.
79. See generally Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 276 (2001).
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sition to exert their particular interests in regulating data. The construct of
“Indigenous data sovereignty” as a broader human rights principle is one
way to more broadly protect the interests of all Indigenous peoples.
C. Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Self-Determination
In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples after more than twenty-five years
of active negotiation among nation-states and representatives of Indigenous
peoples throughout the world.80 The document is important because it rep-
resents the consensus agreement of nation-states that Indigenous peoples
are “peoples” with the same right to self-determination enjoyed by all other
peoples. Prior to this, international human rights law equated Indigenous
peoples with “ethnic and religious minorities,” who have certain human
rights to enjoy their culture and practice their religions in common with
other group members, but lack the political right to self-government.81
The right to self-determination is a moral right that belongs to individ-
uals and to collective groups who constitute a “people.”82 Under interna-
tional human rights law, all “peoples” have a political right to govern them-
selves autonomously and to freely consent to political arrangements with
other governments.83 The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
tracks the language of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights to validate that “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determina-
tion. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”84 The Dec-
laration also provides that, in exercising the right to self-determination, In-
digenous peoples “have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters
relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for
financing their autonomous functions.”85
Consequently, the right to self-determination for Indigenous peoples is
a right to domestic self-determination.86 Indigenous peoples exercise their
right to self-determination within the nation-states that encompass them.
They do not have the right to secede and become independent nations, be-
cause this would impair national boundaries and the territorial integrity of
80. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted 2 October 2007 UNGA Res 61/295)
(UNDRIP).
81. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1967) (describing rights of ethnic and religious minority groups).
82. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 173
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1967).
83. Id.
84. UNDRIP, supra note 80, at art. 3. R
85. Id. at art. 4.
86. Id. at art. 46.
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the nation-states.87 The nation-states have several duties, which are speci-
fied in the document.88 The primary duties are to protect the right of Indige-
nous peoples to exercise self-government, while also ensuring that group
members enjoy equal rights as citizens of the national governments.89 The
nation-states must take action to ensure these distinctive sets of rights, and
also take corrective action to alleviate harms caused by past policies de-
signed to obliterate tribal identity and appropriate tribal lands and re-
sources.90
There are various models to effectuate Indigenous self-determination,
including the tribal sovereignty model used by the United States.91 In some
cases, collaborative or joint management might be required due to the
shared nature of resources such as forests and waters.92 Indigenous self-
government can be expressed through a corporate form, rather than a tribal
form, such as the Alaska Native corporations.93 Indigenous self-government
can also be expressed through intertribal organizations, such as an Indian
Healthcare Board, Education Commission, or Intertribal Court of Appeals.
In these cases, a particular group’s inherent right to sovereignty may or may
not be explicitly recognized by the nation-state.94 The Declaration suggests
that Indigenous people have the right to self-determination, nonetheless,
and therefore, their collective interests must be recognized and accommo-
dated by the nation-state.95
The various articles of the Declaration describe substantive areas
where nation-states must protect the interests of Indigenous peoples.
Among these is Article 31, which provides that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop
their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expres-
sions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cul-
tures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicine, knowledge
of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional
games and visual and performing arts.96
87. Id.
88. See Megan Davis, Data and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, in INDIGENOUS DATA SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARD AN AGENDA 25, 34 (Tahu Kukutai & John Taylor
eds., 2016) (providing an excellent summary of these duties and specifically linking them to issues of
data sovereignty for Indigenous peoples in other countries).
89. Id.
90. Rebecca Tsosie, Reconceptualizing Tribal Rights: Can Self-Determination Be Actualized
Within the U.S. Constitutional Structure?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 923, 929–30, 942, 948 (2011).
91. Id. at 930–31.
92. Id. at 932–33.
93. Id. at 932.
94. Id. at 931–32.
95. Davis, supra note 88, at 34. R
96. UNDRIP, supra note 80, at art. 31. R
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Article 31 further provides that Indigenous peoples have the right to
maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such
cultural heritage, raising the issue of informational privacy, and specifically
how data should be housed and whether it should be made accessible to
third parties.97 According to Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, the United Nations’
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 31 should
be linked with the concept of data sovereignty and discussions of tribal
data.98 Although Article 31 does not specifically outline a right to data sov-
ereignty, this can be inferred from the text defining Indigenous peoples’
right to their knowledge and technologies, as well as their need to transfer
Indigenous knowledge and cultural heritage to future generations.
III. CONSTRUCTING INDIGENOUS DATA SOVEREIGNTY
According to Desi Rodriguez-Lonebear, Indigenous data sovereignty
constitutes the “right and ability of tribes to develop their own systems for
gathering and using data by external actors.”99 This baseline definition en-
compasses several claims, which are broadly applicable to Indigenous peo-
ples throughout the world, and which I will discuss below. This definition
also serves as the impetus for policy development by the federally-recog-
nized tribal governments within the United States, many of whom recently
participated in NCAI’s study on tribal data practices, which is the first study
of its kind and is also discussed below.100
A. The Claims Encompassed within Indigenous Data Sovereignty
At a foundational level, Indigenous data sovereignty is an advocacy
movement intended to build the capacity of Indigenous peoples to exercise
their political right to self-determination in an era where government policy
is “data-driven” and where data sets are increasingly shared and combined
in order to enable “machine learning” and artificial intelligence.101
Dr. Stephanie Carroll Rainie and Desi Rodriguez-Lonebear of the Uni-
versity of Arizona have exercised powerful leadership toward Indigenous
data sovereignty, and they started the United States Indigenous Data Sover-
eignty Network (USIDSN), working in collaboration with representatives
from the global Indigenous data sovereignty movement, led by Indigenous
97. Id.
98. Tauli-Corpez, supra note 2, at xxii–xxiii. R
99. Rodriguez-Lonebear, supra note 14, at 259. R
100. National Congress of American Indians, The State of Tribal Data Capacity in Indian Country:
Key Findings from the Survey of Tribal Data Practices (2018).
101. Radin, supra note 11, at 51–52 (discussing those uses of “Big Data”). R
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scholars in Australia and New Zealand.102 In June 2018, the group con-
vened in Australia for an Indigenous Data Sovereignty Summit and adopted
the following definition: “Indigenous Data Sovereignty is a global move-
ment concerned with the right of Indigenous peoples to govern the creation,
collection, ownership and application of their data.”103
The group broadly defined “data” as “a cultural, strategic and eco-
nomic asset for Indigenous Peoples.”104 The term “data” refers to “informa-
tion or knowledge, in any format or medium, which is about and may affect
Indigenous peoples both collectively and individually.”105 The group con-
siders data sovereignty to be a right that stems from “inherent self-govern-
ance authority and is recognized by the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, to exercise ownership over their data.”106
This right also comprises the right to “govern the creation, collection, ac-
cess, analysis, interpretation, management, dissemination and reuse of the
data.”107
The normative principles are that data should be used in ways that
benefit Indigenous peoples and that data on or about Indigenous peoples
should reflect Indigenous priorities and values.108 Similarly, Indigenous
peoples should have a right to opt into data structures that support these
aspirations and “not participate in data processes inconsistent with the [data
sovereignty Summit] principles.”109
As an advocacy statement, the IDSN statement presents an ideal start-
ing place to analyze the claims for Indigenous data sovereignty. There are
many nuances to be resolved, however, if these aspirations are to receive
legal effect. No government owns all of the data (information) within its
territory or by or about the nation. The term “tribal data” will require care-
ful delineation if it is to serve as a source of enforceable legal rights. Al-
though Article 31 of the UN Declaration provides a conceptual basis for
linking tribal data to larger rights of Indigenous peoples to protect their
cultural heritage, there is nothing within the UN Declaration that would
support a claim to ownership of data on a broad scale, with respect to any
102. See Native Nations Institute at the University of Arizona, US Indigenous Data Sovereignty
Network, https://perma.cc/3W4H-C5CR (last visited Jan. 10, 2019); see also Stephanie Rainie, Desie
Rodriguez-Lonebear, and Andrew Martinez, Policy Brief: Data Governance for Native Nation Rebuild-
ing (Native Nations Institute, 2017), posted on website.
103. Open Communique from the Indigenous Data Sovereignty Summit, Canberra, ACT, to all indi-
viduals involved in data and data infrastructure in Australia, Indigenous Data Sovereignty (June 20,
2018), https://perma.cc/8VPR-9TTL.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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particular Indigenous peoples. In fact, within the United States, tribal gov-
ernments may exercise autonomy over their members and reservation, even
if they are part of a larger “people.” Accordingly, the Cheyenne River
Sioux Nation has the ability to regulate data differently than the Rosebud
Sioux Nation or the Oglala Lakota Nation, even though all of these tribal
governments are part of the Lakota people.
As a legal construct, Indigenous data sovereignty is primarily about
protecting each tribal government’s right to regulate data within its terri-
tory—and arguably about its members—as well as protecting Indigenous
peoples more broadly from harmful or exploitive policies of the encompass-
ing nation-state. In the first case, data sovereignty is used to build tribal
capacity to exercise self-determination.110 In the latter case, data sover-
eignty is invoked to require changes in national or international law that
might be necessary to accord “equality” of citizenship or to protect the In-
digenous group’s right to self-government.111
Both objectives appear to be central to the Indigenous Sovereignty
movement.112 According to Dr. Walter, Indigenous data sovereignty is the
corrective to the “data of disregard” generated by settler governments be-
cause it allows Indigenous peoples to govern the interpretation and use of
data about them and prevent misuses of information that harm the group.113
Additionally, in the hands of Indigenous communities, data can foster na-
tion-building by empowering Indigenous peoples to gather their own data
and generate information that can be used to formulate strategies and obtain
resources.114 In the text that follows, I will develop the two respective
claims.
1. The Need to Overcome Data Inequity, Racism, and Marginalization
As many proponents of Indigenous data sovereignty point out, data
gathered by the national government can reflect the dominant society’s bi-
ases, for example, the need to demonstrate “disparities” between the Indige-
nous and non-Indigenous populations.115 Dr. Maggie Walter describes this
as a “data of disregard” in which indigeneity is used as a “predictor varia-
110. Maggie Walter, Data Politics and Indigenous Representation in Australian Statistics, in INDIGE-
NOUS DATA SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARD AN AGENDA 79, xxii (Tahu Kukutai & John Taylor eds., 2016).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 80 (describing this as “Five D” Data collected by national government about Indigenous
peoples to demonstrate “disparity, deprivation, disadvantage, dysfunction, and difference”). Dr. Maggie
Walter also gave a lecture on this topic at the University of Arizona on September 5, 2018, which the
author attended.
114. Id. at 94. (describing impacts of data governance by national government, which minimized
recognition of tribal sovereignty over Indigenous lands).
115. Id. at 80–81 (Tahu Kukutai & John Taylor eds., 2016).
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ble” to describe risk or likelihood of problems, for example, related to
health, educational achievement, incarceration: disadvantage, disparity, dif-
ference.116 In this case, the dominant society’s cultural narrative controls
the process of gathering data and determines the content of the study.117
The data can be used “against” Indigenous peoples in many ways, not the
least of which is to link them with criminality, susceptibility to disease, or
vulnerability.118 Researchers are not “accountable” for these harms. They
receive the benefit of using the data without having any liability for the
harm that falls upon the community.119
The problem of data inequity is pervasive and tracks global move-
ments of colonialism and domination of Indigenous peoples. Lonebear
notes that “marginalized populations across the globe continue to face glar-
ing data inequities.”120 In the United States, data inequity for Indigenous
peoples means that there is a lack of relevant information about Native
populations, which constrains tribal governments from the ability to engage
in appropriate planning and community development.121 It also means that
tribal governments are in a state of “data dependence.”122 Rather than being
able to generate and use their own data, tribal governments are typically
dependent upon data generated by federal, state and local governments and
collected for their specific purposes.123 This data is not necessarily accurate
or relevant to the needs of tribal communities.
Additionally, there is a need to identify a consistent “statistical data
standard” to govern the collection and reporting of American Indian popu-
lation data across agencies.124 According to Lonebear, the United States
does not have such a standard, and this is partially attributable to its histori-
cal practices.125 As Lonebear demonstrates, tribes were affirmatively ex-
cluded from the United States Census prior to 1924, when Congress passed
legislation naturalizing American Indian people to U.S. citizenship.126 The
federal government sometimes sponsored “tribal census counts” as a means
to determine how many Indians were eligible to take distributions of tribal
116. THINK DIGITAL FUTURES: DATA OF DISREGARD (2ser 107.3 radio broadcast) (audio at https://
perma.cc/87N9-ZHA9).
117. See Walter, supra note 11510, at 80–82. R
118. Id. at 83, 86.
119. Id. at 85.
120. Desi Rodriguez-Lonebear, Building a data revolution in Indian Country, in INDIGENOUS DATA
SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARD AN AGENDA 253, 253 (Tahu Kukutai & John Taylor eds., 2016).
121. Id. at 254, 259.
122. Id. at 258.
123. Id. at 259.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 257.
17
Tsosie: Tribal Data Governance
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2019
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-2\MON204.txt unknown Seq: 18  1-AUG-19 12:03
246 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 80
funds or services.127 Indian agents might also undertake a census to see how
many “Indian males” were needed to satisfy a treaty provision requiring
that a certain percentage of eligible adult males consent to further cessions
of tribal lands.128 The accuracy of 19th century census counts has been
contested in modern land claims litigation, alleging that federal officials
undercounted the total population and sometimes miscounted by including
persons who were not even tribal members.129
A further issue is how data is linked more broadly to American Indian
or Alaska Native populations, rather than specifically to particular tribal
nations. If the data is identified as “Indigenous” or “American Indian,”
rather than linked to a specific tribal group, what rights would attach? For
example there is no list of who is “Aboriginal” in Australia, challenging the
ability of Indigenous peoples in that country to control their data.130 Simi-
larly, in some countries, such as Mexico, “Indigenous identity” is linked to
language, rather than blood quantum or descent.131 The definition used by
the national government may negate the actual identities of Indigenous per-
sons in that country132 and preclude them from controlling their data. Some
version of this problem also exists in the United States in relation to Native
Hawaiian people and members of non-recognized tribal groups. It may also
extend to Indians who are not enrolled as tribal citizens, if enrollment is the
primary criterion for a census count.133 Many Indians, even those living on-
reservation, are not enrolled as tribal citizens, and federal courts are increas-
ingly suspicious of “ancestry-based” definitions of who is “American In-
dian” or “Indigenous,” seeing those as “racial” descriptors, rather than po-
litical designations.134
127. Id. at 262.
128. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371
(1980) (Addressing a treaty which required 3/4 of adult males to consent, but in fact, less than “10% of
the adult male Sioux population” signed the “agreement” that was enacted into law in 1877 removing
the Black Hills and a significant portion of the 1868 Treaty reservation).
129. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (regarding deficiencies in United States
government’s disposition of treaty lands belonging to the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache tribes pursuant
to the Treaty of Medicine Lodge, which required the consent of “at least three fourths of all the adult
male Indians occupying the reservation” before any further land cessions could be made); United States
v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (federal negotiators in fact secured consent of only 10% of adult
male Sioux Indians, rather than the three-fourths required by the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, and used
this alleged “agreement” with the Sioux people to motivate Congress to enact a statute in 1877 that
appropriated most of the Tribe’s treaty guaranteed land, including the sacred Black Hills, the origin
place of the Lakota Sioux people, without any effort to give equivalent value for the land).
130. Walter, supra note 1130. R
131. Snipp, supra note 3, at 41. R
132. Id.
133. Id. at 49–50.
134. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (striking down Hawaii’s attempt to restrict election
of trustees for Office of Hawaiian Affairs to persons of Hawaiian descent because the state was using
“ancestry as a proxy for race” and therefore violating the 15th amendment, which prohibits use of race
18
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In sum, dependence upon other governments to define Indigenous
identity and collect data about Indigenous populations runs contrary to the
goal of Indigenous self-determination. According to Lonebear, less than 2%
of data about tribal populations in the United States is generated by the
tribes themselves, while the remaining 98% of sources “span the U.S. Cen-
sus, administrative agencies such as the BIA and HUD, national surveys
and numerous scholarly references.”135 Lonebear asserts that this is not an
acceptable foundation for tribal self-determination, and she argues that In-
digenous data sovereignty is crucial for “nation-building.”136
2. Indigenous Data Sovereignty as Nation-Building
Indigenous data sovereignty is about who defines and controls data
about Indigenous peoples.137 Lonebear asserts that “[d]ata sovereignty is
about tribal control: control over who, what, when, where and why for all
data projects pertaining to tribal citizens and resources.”138 Although the
ultimate goal might be “by us for us,” Lonebear states that the reality is that
many tribes lack the expertise and resources necessary to do this.139 So,
there is also a need to secure trained staff to undertake these functions.140
This raises the issue of data capacity: because tribes currently have limited
capacity to undertake the range of studies needed to produce the data that
they need, they require access to the data produced by other governments
and entities.141
At a fundamental level, data is knowledge, and that knowledge is pro-
duced through a sequence of processes, including the following aspects of a
research study: (1) a decision-maker identifies the need for information and
creates study questions designed to elicit certain facts; (2) the study is
funded; (3) the study begins and information is gathered; (4) the informa-
tion gathered is interpreted or analyzed; (5) the findings or conclusions of
the study are released as “fact”; (6) the study is “archived” and made acces-
as a criterion for the right to vote); Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (2018) (district court in
Texas finds the Indian Child Welfare Act unconstitutional partly because the statute encompasses chil-
dren who are only marginally “Indian”in terms of ancestry and lack defined political ties with tribe).
135. Lonebear, supra note 120, at 259. R
136. Id.
137. Id. at 259, 267.
138. Id. at 267.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 268.
141. Id. at 267.
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sible to others; (7) the data from the study may or may not be used by other
researchers for their independent studies (defined as “reuse”).142
At each step of the process, the type of knowledge generated and pro-
duced is subject to influence by external entities. This reflects a central
challenge of data governance in settler societies, which is “who has the
power and authority to make rules and decisions about the design, interpre-
tation, validation, ownership, access to, and use of data.”143 Maggie Walter
notes that data produced by national governments in “First World colonized
nations,” such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand,
uses population numbers to signify portrayals of Indigenous peoples.144 The
numbers are purportedly “neutral,” but in fact should be “understood as
human artefacts, imbued with meaning.”145 The meaning derived from sta-
tistics on the deficiencies and disparities of Indigenous peoples, for exam-
ple, reflects the “social norms, values, and racial hierarchy” of the settler
society.146 Walter draws on Edward Bonilla-Silva’s work to describe how
“claims for non-white inferiority” can be made in the present-day by refer-
ence to “neutral statistics,” allowing for the persistence of “racism” but
“without racists.”147
This powerful insight supports Lonebear’s assertion that tribal govern-
ments should develop their own tribal data sources.148 According to
Lonebear, “Tribal data are perhaps the most valuable tools of self-determi-
nation because they drive tribal nation building by tribes for tribes.”149 Tri-
bal governments can use Indigenous research methodologies to design and
implement their studies, thereby securing the data needed for nation build-
ing.150 In the meantime, the federal governments should ensure “improved
collection of official statistics on tribal citizens” and identify ways to “make
those statistics maximally useful to tribes.”151
Building Indigenous data capacity will require governing protocols
and the ability to negotiate Indigenous data sovereignty with the entities
142. Dr. Maggie Walter, Dr. Stephanie Rainie, and Michelle Deshong, Ph.D. Candidate, Fulbright
Scholar, presentations on Indigenous Data Sovereignty and the Governance of Indigenous Data at Aca-
demic Institutions, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ (Sept. 5, 2018).
143. Diane E. Smith, Governing data and data for governance: the everyday practice of Indigenous
sovereignty, in INDIGENOUS DATA SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARD AN AGENDA 117, 119 (Tahu Kukutai & John
Taylor eds., 2016).
144. Walter, supra note 110, at 79–80.
145. Id. at 79.
146. Id. at 80.
147. Id. at 83–84 (citing EDWARD BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOUR-BLIND RA-
CISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, (3d ed. 2010)).
148. Lonebear, supra note 120, at 261. R
149. Id. at 265.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 261.
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that control national or provincial and state data statistics. To the extent that
tribal data sets are combined with other data sets, there will be issues re-
garding data storage. Data could be housed in a central national repository
with access limited by an agreement with tribal governments. Some tribal
governments would prefer a community repository on tribal lands, allowing
for territorial regulation by the tribal government and data-sharing by vari-
ous agencies within the tribal government. Others might favor legal agree-
ments between a tribe and a researcher, which contractually place owner-
ship of data with the tribal government. These are issues for tribal govern-
ments to resolve in conversation with other governments, with researchers,
and with research institutions and their review boards. Database security is
a significant component of Indigenous data sovereignty.
B. Tribal Data: Access, Ownership, and Equity
In October 2018, the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI)
released the first study to survey American Indian and Alaska Native Na-
tions on data access, ownership and equity in Indian country.152 The NCAI
study starts by noting that American Indian and Alaska Native Nations (AI/
AN) require reliable information for planning and development, just like
other governments.153 However, unlike other governments, AI/AN tribes
“still rely on incomplete and inadequate data about their citizens and re-
sources,” and this is only one aspect of the “data gap” in Indian country.154
The researchers find evidence of “vast data inequities,” such as the “largest
census undercount of any racial or ethnic group,” as well as the highest
incidence of “misidentification in vital and administrative records.”155 Fi-
nally, the report notes the “persistent digital divide” that continues to affect
tribal governments in their governance efforts.156
The survey was distributed to tribal officials from all federally-recog-
nized tribes, and it was also completed by a small group of state-recognized
tribes.157 The study findings were based on the respondents from federally-
recognized tribes, which constituted nearly 25% of the 567 federally-recog-
nized groups that received the survey.158 The tribes represented most of the
regions in the country, and most were comprised of 5,000 or fewer tribal
members.159
152. NCAI Policy Research Center, The State of Tribal Data Capacity in Indian Country: Key Find-
ings from the Survey of Tribal Data Practices, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS 2, (2018).
153. Id. at 1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2–3.
158. Id. at 5.
159. Id. at 6.
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Eighty-three percent of the respondents indicated that it is extremely
important for tribes to collect and have access to data on their tribal popula-
tions, primarily because this is necessary for grant reporting, to communi-
cate effectively with tribal members, and to set tribal priorities and goals.160
Respondents indicated that most of the external data that they use
comes from the United States Census Bureau, the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development and other federal agen-
cies.161 To a lesser extent, they reported using state and county agency data,
as well as data from universities and colleges.162 Not surprisingly, tribal
data practices are largely funded by tribal budgets or by federal grants and
contracts.163
Tribal representatives expressed concern about protecting the privacy
of their tribal citizens with respect to data collection, management and
use.164 Approximately 28% of respondents stated that they had formal
mechanisms to approve research on tribal members, such as an institutional
review board and committee.165 Most of the tribes had created a “data hub
or central data office” to manage tribal data, and over half of the tribes had
the ability to share data between tribal departments.166
Tribes expressed a broad range of areas in which they need more or
better data on tribal members. The greatest need was for cultural informa-
tion, such as tribal language fluency, and this is perhaps not unexpected,
given that such surveys are probably the least likely to be funded by federal
grants and the most likely to be perceived as sensitive by tribal members.167
Respondents also noted the need for data related to health, education, hous-
ing, employment, income, household composition, and current contact in-
formation.168
The study indicated that most tribes lack the financial capacity to fund
the data activities that they require.169 However, they also expressed con-
cern about federal, state and local data sources, which are likely to be defi-
cient and/or inaccurate.170 Although there have been sporadic efforts by
federal agencies to collect comprehensive data on a particular issue relevant
to Native peoples, for example on tribal justice agencies or Native Ameri-
160. Id. at 7.
161. Id. at 8.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 9.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id. at 9.
166. Id. at 9–10.
167. Id. at 11.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 13.
170. Id. at 12.
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can housing needs, these are generally one-time efforts linked to a specific
need for compliance and/or grant funding.171 Other studies may be funded
by state or private organizations interested in issues such as tribal economic
development or health disparities, primarily because there is a strong inter-
face between state and tribal service populations and economies.172 Again,
the studies have been directed toward specific groups of tribal governments
and specific purposes, so the broader comparative research may be lacking,
and the level of detail needed by a tribal government is also likely to be
lacking.
The study concludes with a series of recommendations.173 The para-
mount goal is to establish that “ensuring accurate, relevant, and timely tribal
data should be considered part of the federal trust responsibility,” and that
federal agencies should “provide technical assistance and direct financial
support for tribal data practices through official government-to-government
consultation.”174
Building on that recommendation, this essay will survey three areas of
particular concern to illustrate the data gaps and issues confronting tribal
governments, and the essay will discuss how the federal trust responsibility
is implicated by each area and ought to extend to the issue of data collec-
tion, use and access.
IV. IMPLEMENTING INDIGENOUS DATA SOVEREIGNTY: THE CHALLENGE
OF DATA GOVERNANCE
Tribal governments must work cooperatively with state and local gov-
ernments, as well as the federal government, in many areas, including law
enforcement, healthcare administration, and environmental regulation. In-
digenous data sovereignty can be used to identify and respond to the ex-
isting gaps, but there will be challenges to effective intergovernmental ad-
ministration of data and databases, as this section of the essay discusses.
Each section starts with a case study and then describes the challenges of
data governance.
A. Law Enforcement Data
In the summer of 2018, the body of a young Native woman, Olivia
Lone Bear, was found in a pickup truck submerged in a lake by her home
171. See Id. at 14 (citing 2002 Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Census of Tribal Justice Agencies and the
2017 Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Assessment of Native American, Alaska Na-
tive, and Native Hawaiian Housing Needs).
172. See, e.g., Id.
173. Id. at 16.
174. Id.
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on the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota.175 Olivia was the mother
of five young children, and she had been “missing” since October 25,
2017.176 Her family had asked tribal, state and federal law enforcement au-
thorities to search the water as well as the lands within the 1 million-acre
reservation.177 The various law enforcement agencies divided their jurisdic-
tion over the land search, but none would assume responsibility for the
water search.178 The tribal law enforcement officers started the land search
immediately after Olivia disappeared, but they could only search the water
if they had criminal jurisdiction, which would occur only if both the victim
and perpetrator were Native.179 No one knew how or why Olivia disap-
peared. The State disclaimed jurisdiction over the 1 million-acre reserva-
tion, except for a crime that involved only a non-Indian victim and a non-
Indian perpetrator.180 However, it was ultimately the Williams County law
enforcement officers who sent divers into the lake adjacent to Olivia’s
home after nine months, and they located her body.181
Olivia’s tragic story gives us important information about the lack of
coordination among law enforcement agencies that has contributed to a set
of alarming statistics. According to existing data surveys, Native women
are murdered at rates 10 times higher than the national average in many
counties on or adjacent to reservation lands.182 The rate of murder is likely
to be higher because Native women also “go missing” at very high rates.183
If they are “missing,” they are technically not murder victims—yet who
keeps the data on “missing” Native women?
May 5, 2018 was designated as the “National Day of Awareness for
Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls.”184 A 2018 High
Country news story documents that, in the State of Washington, Native
Americans are less than two percent of the population, but represent over
175. Jack Dura, Olivia Lone Bear’s Family Awaits Autopsy Results After Funeral, BISMARCK TRIB-
UNE (Aug. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/X9TD-V5SJ.
176. Amy Goodman, Body of Olivia Lone Bear Found in N. Dakota as Native Women Face Crisis of
Murders, Disappearances, DEMOCRACY NOW (Aug. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/X8HM-S3SA; Mike Mc-
Cleary, Olivia Lone Bear Case Awaits Answers after 14 Months, BISMARK TRIBUNE (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/MF6L-3K83.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Id.
181. Id.
182. Ronet Bachman et al., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 5 (2008) https://perma.cc/6RPF-XKYJ.
183. Goodman, supra note 197.
184. Graham Lee Brewer, The Crisis of Murdered and Missing Indigenous Women: The Response to
a Disproportionate Problem is Falling Short, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/
Y2D4-GP6L.
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five percent of its missing persons cases.185 State lawmakers are just now
considering how to collect the data that would help state, local and tribal
law enforcement authorities understand more about the problem. According
to State Representative Gina McCabe, “there is currently no comprehensive
data collection system for reporting or tracking missing Native American
women.”186 In March 2018, Governor Inslee signed a bill to assist with the
crisis of missing and murdered women in the State of Washington.187 Other
states are also examining the issue and taking action. For example, Arizona
Governor Doug Ducey recently signed a bill that will create an Arizona
Task Force on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women.188 The Task
Force will bring together a multidisciplinary team of state and tribal repre-
sentatives to establish standardized methods for gathering data in these
cases, as they arise in Arizona.189
The U.S. Department of Justice operates a publicly accessible
database, which currently lists 144 cases of Native American women re-
ported missing and 22 cases of “Native American female unidentified re-
mains.”190 The undercount is staggering. In Canada, a much less populous
country, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police released a 2013 report indicat-
ing 1,181 missing or murdered aboriginal women.191 Annita Lucchesi, a
Native American doctoral student, used both data sets to start assembling
her own list of missing and murdered Indigenous women in the U.S. and
Canada, which as of 2018, numbered 2,501 persons.192 She has since cre-
ated an online database for this on-going work.193
In 2018, the United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs ap-
proved Savanna’s Act, a bill named for another young Native American
woman who went “missing” in 2017 and whose mutilated body was later
found, after her brutal murder.194 The bill was not enacted that session, yet
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws SHB 2951.SL; see also Rachel Sun, New Washington Law Aims to
Help Find Missing Native American Women, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (April 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/
P69M-LT3P.
188. Grace Oldham, Ducey Signs Bill into Law that Will Study Missing, Murdered Indigenous Wo-
men, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (May 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/69HC-2RC.
189. Id.
190. Nat’l Inst. of Justice, National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs), https://
perma.cc/7CUJ-8K6S (last visited June 8, 2019).
191. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, MISSING AND MURDERED ABORIGINAL WOMEN: A NATIONAL
OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW 3 https://perma.cc/T6H8-575P.
192. Mary Anette Pember, Mapping Out Missing and Murdered Native Women: I Would Want My
Story to Have Meaning, REWIRE.NEWS (Apr. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/24J9-KGTD.
193. Id.; see also Anita Lucchesi, Missing & Murdered Indigenous Women Database, https://
perma.cc/UTV3-D325 (last visited January 25, 2019).
194. AP Posting, U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Approved Savanna’s Act, VALLEY NEWS
LIVE (Nov. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/9NZE-FEFT.
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was reintroduced in 2019, sponsored by Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK),
and if passed, would expand tribal access to federal crime databases and
establish uniform protocols for handling cases of missing and murdered Na-
tive Americans.195 It would also require annual reports to Congress on the
number of missing and murdered Native American women.196 The Seattle-
based Urban Indian Health Institute released a report the same week citing
the work of its research team that indicated that there were over 500 miss-
ing persons and homicide cases involving Native women in 71 cities.197
The cases were identified through public records requests and media re-
ports.198 The researchers stated that the figure is likely an undercount “be-
cause some police departments in cities with substantial Native American
populations, including Albuquerque, did not respond to their requests” and
because “Native American women are often incorrectly identified as be-
longing to another race.”199 The report recommends improvement in data
collection training and standards.200
Christopher Chaney, a member of the Seneca-Cayuga Nation, who
serves as unit Chief for the FBI Office of the General Counsel’s Criminal
Justice Information Law Unit, has written on tribal data sovereignty, noting
that “the law has not kept pace with the rapid evolution of technology.”201
Chaney finds that tribal governments are enacting tribal data laws to meet
the need of the government and its members to access reliable data to fulfill
law enforcement needs.202 The 2010 Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA)
required tribal governments to have access to the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation databases, which are housed in the FBI’s Criminal Justice Informa-
tion Services (CJIS) Division in West Virginia.203
The CJIS maintains 21 criminal databases, most of which contain data
important to tribal governments.204 For example, there are databases identi-
fying fugitives, missing persons, registered sex offenders, and persons sub-
ject to domestic violence protection orders.205 All of these sources of infor-
195. See Savanna’s Act, S. 227, 116th Cong. (2019–2020).
196. Id.
197. Annita Lucchesi, Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women & Girls: A Snapshot of Data from
Urban Cities in the United States, URBAN INDIAN HEALTH INSTITUTE, at 7 (2017); AP Posting, supra
note 194. R
198. Id. at 4. AP Posting, supra note 194. R
199. AP Posting, supra note 194; Lucchesi, supra note 197, at 1, 14, 22. R
200. Id.; AP Posting, supra note 194. R
201. Christopher B. Chaney, Data Sovereignty in Tribal Governance: Is the Law Keeping Pace with
Technology? TRIBALNET MAGAZINE 12 (Fall 2018) https://perma.cc/PKK4-RAGC.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Christopher B. Chaney, Data Sovereignty and the Tribal Law and Order Act, THE FEDERAL
LAWYER 24 (Apr., 2018) https://perma.cc/F9G3-VR4T (describing the various criminal databases within
the FBI’s CJIS division).
205. Id. at 24.
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mation are potentially useful to tribal police officers, and could also be use-
ful to tribal governments seeking to do background checks on potential
employees. The TLOA was intended to facilitate effective partnerships be-
tween state, local, federal and tribal law enforcement agencies.206 The CJIS
favors “shared management” by the various law enforcement agencies and
has created four nonfederal working groups, as well as a Tribal Task Force,
to facilitate cooperation among governments and their representative agen-
cies and offices.207
The FBI CJIS Uniform Crime Reporting Program issues an annual
Crime in the United States report, and tribal jurisdiction law enforcement
data is included in this report.208 Accurate data depends upon the input from
tribal law enforcement agencies. According to Chaney, tribal law enforce-
ment agencies that receive funding from the BIA Office of Justice Services
are required to report crime data to the BIA, and the TLOA requires the
BIA to forward the data to the FBI CJIS UCR program on a tribe-by-tribe
basis.209 The FBI also operates specialized programs enabling law enforce-
ment agencies to share data and these may be utilized by tribal govern-
ments.210 In addition, federal law authorizes tribal governments in some
circumstances to have access to the FBI’s fingerprint files, for example,
when they hire individuals who will be working around children or occupy-
ing positions of authority as casino officials.211
The TLOA model is an example of the federal government building
upon the trust responsibility to include tribal law enforcement agencies
within the federal law enforcement data system. Notably, tribal govern-
ments are recognized as holding sovereignty over data collected by tribal
law enforcement officers, and the act of sharing this data is incentivized by
federal law, but still depends upon tribal consent.212 Some tribal govern-
ments may be hesitant to broadly share tribal law enforcement data, due to
troubled histories with local and state law enforcement officers and tribal
residents. Historical context influences the likelihood of data-sharing, as the
next section of this essay illustrates.
B. Health Data
In 2004, national attention focused on a lawsuit filed by the Havasupai
Tribe against Arizona State University and the Arizona Board of Regents
206. Id. at 23.
207. Id. at 24.
208. Id.
209. Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 2802(c)(15) (2010).
210. Chaney, supra note 204, at 25. R
211. Id.
212. Id. at 24.
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for alleged research misconduct in association with a diabetes research pro-
ject undertaken by an ASU faculty member, who subsequently moved to
the University of Arizona.213 The Tribe alleged that physical samples
(blood, tissue, handprints) and genealogy information taken from tribal
members during the diabetes study had later been shared with researchers at
other institutions for other purposes, including investigations of population
origin and migration, and schizophrenia, which were not authorized as part
of the diabetes study.214 The Tribe asserted that these uses violated human
subjects research protocols requiring informed consent, and that they were
harmful to the Tribe and its members because they stigmatized the Tribe
and were also culturally offensive because they challenged the Tribe’s own
origin stories and attempted to advance other theories of human origins.215
The researcher claimed that she had done nothing wrong because data-shar-
ing was common practice among biomedical researchers at the time, but it
was clear that the researchers had not obtained consent for the reuse of the
data, particularly in ways that were antithetical to the Tribe’s interests and
cultural belief system.216 The case ultimately settled out of court217 and
ASU repatriated the physical samples and paid a sum of damages to the
Tribe and the affected members, and also undertook several initiatives de-
signed to assist the Tribe. However, the case caused many tribes, including
the Navajo Nation, to ban genetic research and posed significant barriers to
biomedical researchers seeking to work in tribal communities.218
In Canada, a similar case involving the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation in
British Columbia, Canada, arose, when the blood samples taken from tribal
members were shared with other researchers without the Tribe’s knowledge
or consent, and that case also resulted in the return of the blood samples.219
The Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) then engaged in an ex-
tensive consultation process with Indigenous communities to develop new
protocols for researchers undertaking studies with tribal members.220 The
CIHR guidelines required “reconsent for multiple uses of samples, ac-
213. Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native American Genetic Resources
and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35(3), JOURNAL OF LAW MEDICINE AND ETHICS 396, 396 (2017);
Rosalina James et al., Exploring Pathways to Trust: A Tribal Perspective on Data Sharing, 16(11),
GENETIC MEDICINE 820 (2014).
214. Tsosie, supra note 213, at 396. R
215. Id.; see generally Tilousi v. Arizona State U., 04-CV-1290-PCT-FJM, 2005 WL 6199562, at *2
(D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2005) (later action that gives background information on the case against the Univer-
sity and its professors).
216. Snipp, supra note 3, at 49.
217. Amy Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit Research of its DNA, NEW YORK TIMES (April
21, 2010), https://perma.cc/JQ6E-VRFS.
218. Id.; Sara Reardon, Navajo Nation Reconsiders Ban on Genetic Research, NATURE (Oct. 6,
2017), https://perma.cc/3E4D-6E9L.
219. James et al., supra note 213 at 822. R
220. Id.
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knowledgement of intellectual property (IP) rights, and protection of Indig-
enous rights in cultural and sacred knowledge.”221
In the United States, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) data-shar-
ing policies are intended to maximize public benefit derived from genetic
studies by increasing research efficiency and use of a “pooled data re-
source” for future studies.222 However, the NIH engaged in extensive re-
view of its processes in the wake of the Havasupai case to assess tribal
interests and the federal trust obligation to protect the sovereign rights of
tribal governments.223 There are several issues that arise with genetic re-
search, involving research agreements, the collection, management and sec-
ondary use of research data, and the policies concerning access to data
stored in federal repositories.224
The NIH released a Request for Information (RFI) on October 10,
2018 on three specific proposed provisions within their draft NIH Data
Management and Sharing Policy.225 The provisions concern three areas: (1)
the definition of “Scientific Data”; (2) the requirements for Data Manage-
ment and Sharing Plans; and (3) optimal timing for implementing the pol-
icy.226 On that same day, the NCAI distributed a set of recommendations
for tribal leaders.227 In brief, they recommended that the definition of “sci-
entific data” should be modified to include “data used to support scholarly
publications and presentations.”228 Because scholarly presentations often
occur prior to a researcher’s publication of the research study, these
presentations can also be used to advance the field of knowledge, and
should also be under the governance authority of the tribe. Currently, the
NIH Common Rule provides that researchers who use federal funding must
follow tribal research codes, which are often more restrictive than the Com-
mon Rule.229 Thus, the definitions within tribal research codes, including
the definition of “data,” should be binding upon researchers who seek to
work with the tribe and tribal members.
NCAI also recommends that all plans involving research and scientific
data with American Indian and Alaska Native tribes should include specific
221. Id.
222. Id. at 820.
223. Id. at 820.
224. Id. at 820.
225. NOT-OD-19-015: Request for Information (RFI) on Proposed Provisions for a Draft Data
Management and Sharing Policy for NIH Funded or Supported Research, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
HEALTH (Oct. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/5WAF-YF3T.
226. Id.
227. Email from NCAI Policy Research Center to Author, NIH Request for Information: Proposed
Provisions for a Draft NIH Data Management and Sharing Policy for NIH Funded or Supported Re-
search (Dec. 10, 2018) (copy on file with MONTANA LAW REVIEW).
228. Id.
229. 45 C.F.R. 690.101 (2017).
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information on how the plan complies with tribal research codes, document
official tribal approval for the plan, and should describe in detail how the
plan implements tribal requirements on data management and sharing to
“ensure that tribal nation(s) and their citizens, lands, and resources are pro-
tected” along with how the plan will implement any tribal restrictions to
data sharing.230 NCAI recommends that the NIH staff should find plans
unacceptable if they do not meet these requirements.231
In addition, NCAI recommends that these restrictions should be opera-
tive anytime the data includes “data and information from American Indian
and Alaska Native tribes and individuals.”232 The researcher should de-
scribe in detail how the data was obtained and whether there is documenta-
tion of tribal approval for the plan for data sharing.233 The Tribe should
govern each element of the plan, including the types of data to be collected
and shared, any relevant associated data to be shared, the method of how
the data will be processed or analyzed and the standards to be used in data
collection and sharing.234 Tribal governments have continuously asserted
that the NIH should engage in a formal consultation process with AI/AN
tribal governments prior to adopting any official policy on data sharing.235
The legal and ethical issues for tribal communities working with bi-
omedical researchers continue to emerge, given new forms of genomic re-
search, for example those associated with the NIH “precision medicine”
Initiative, which is directed at aligning medical interventions with a pa-
tient’s specific genome.236 Stanford University and the University of Ari-
zona are among the research institutions that have secured grant funding
from the NIH Precision Medicine Initiative.237 The projects require sam-
pling and pooled data, so the participation of tribal members in these studies
is seen as necessary to serve the mission of the NIH to “reduce health dis-
parities” in marginalized populations, including Native Americans, but it
230. Email from NCAI Policy Research Center, supra note 227. R
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. James, supra note 213, at 828; and the NCAI Policy Research Update, supra note 227, specifies R
that a public request for “comment” is not the same as the consultation required by federal law to
effectuate the trust responsibility.
236. Precision Medicine Initiative and Cancer Research, NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE (Jan. 30,
2015), https://perma.cc/H5CK-JU56.
237. Kris Newby, Health Disparities Research Center Launched with $11.5 Million Grant, STAN-
FORD MED. NEWS CTR. (Apr. 19, 2016) https://perma.cc/M2DC-DPHZ; Project Information, RE-
SEARCH PORTFOLIO ONLINE REPORTING TOOLS (Jan. 1, 2018, 8:58 PM MST), https://
perma.cc/8J9M-223T.
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also raises the need for tribal consultation and specific protocols to dis-
charge the trust responsibility.238
Federally-funded research studies will generally require a formal con-
sultation process and restrictions upon data sharing.239 However, this may
not be true for state-funded health research.
State health agencies also undertake health research, often through
community health boards and agencies that serve both urban and rural
populations. There are many Native Americans living in large urban areas,
such as Los Angeles, Seattle, Albuquerque, Phoenix, and Portland.240 Some
are enrolled members of federally-recognized tribes, some are not enrolled,
some are members of state-recognized tribes, and some have Native Hawai-
ian ancestry.  State health studies may require physical samples or behav-
ioral health information, and they may include tribal data if relevant to the
particular study (such as whether tribal healing modalities are effective in
dealing with substance issues, such as opioid addiction). In those cases, it is
not always clear what the state’s obligations are. The individual participants
will always have privacy rights that protect their individual identities, but
some of the data is likely to trigger tribal concerns over data governance.
The structures for cooperation are not as robust with respect to state/tribal
healthcare systems as they are for tribal/federal systems, although there are
very similar needs and concerns. In fact, state laws and policies might re-
quire collection of physical samples, such as newborn blood spots, that trig-
ger cultural concerns similar to those expressed by the Havasupai Tribe.
There are many unresolved questions for state governments related to
Indigenous data sovereignty. Do community healthcare clinics that are “tri-
bally serving” have the right to assert Indigenous data sovereignty as a col-
lective group? Are the informational privacy concerns of tribal governments
met by having data “de-identified” for the individual participant? Do feder-
ally-recognized tribes, as beneficiaries of the federal trust responsibility,
possess greater protections than Indigenous peoples that lack that status?
Do states have any special legal or ethical obligations to Indigenous peoples
more broadly? Clearly, there is a profound need for cooperative frameworks
for consultation and respectful co-management of data by state/local gov-
ernments, tribal governments, and the various educational institutions work-
ing on biomedical technologies.
238. Project Information, RESEARCH PORTFOLIO ONLINE REPORTING TOOLS (Jan. 1, 2018) https://
perma.cc/8J9M-223T.
239. e.g., NIH Data Sharing Policy and Implementation Guidance, National Institutes of Health
(June 8, 2019) https://perma.cc/DPJ284QU.
240. Matthew Snipp, The Size and Distribution of the American Indian Population: Fertility, Moral-
ity, Migration, and Residence, CHANGING NUMBERS CHANGING NEEDS AMERICAN INDIAN DEMOGRAPHY
AND PUBLIC HEALTH 39 (Gary D. Sandefur, Ronald R. Rindfuss Barney Cohen eds., 1996).
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C. Environmental Data
Indian Country Today recently ran a special report that offers a com-
pelling example of the data issues relevant to environmental regulation on
the reservation.241 The story takes place in Red Valley on the Navajo Na-
tion, near the Chuska Mountains, on lands used as a summer sheep camp
for generations by the family of Sally Benally and her daughters, Orlinda
Benally and Marlene Begay.242 Within a quarter mile of the family’s wood
cabin and corrals, is an idle oil well, drilled in 1967, but not used for 18
months.243 It is one of the ten “idle” oil wells surrounding the cabin.244 The
pipelines surrounding the wells sit on top of the dirt, but they are now
“ragged and frayed.”245 The air smells like “burnt rubber, sulfur and rotten
eggs,” and the water from the spring in the mountain, once clear, now “runs
yellow” at many times, according to residents.246 The family and their
neighbors complain of feeling sick, with headaches, nausea, sore throats,
and have reached out to the Navajo Nation Environmental Protection
Agency, the Navajo Nation Natural Resources Department, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the Bureau of Land Management, requesting an analysis
of air and water quality, but have not yet received a response.247 Clearly,
there is an environmental health problem for the Benally family and their
neighbors, but what is the solution?
The problem in this case-study is not fracking, which causes similar
health effects in residents, but rather, it is the decaying infrastructure of the
oil boom of the past century.248 According to the reporter, there are an esti-
mated 3.5 million oil and gas wells in North America, but there is no “fed-
eral agency or national organization” that has a cumulative index of the
wells, their location, or their status as “inactive” or idle.249 If an oil or gas
well is inactive and not capped, it becomes a conduit for the escape of
hydrocarbons, such as benzene, salt, and heavy metals (including uranium),
into the air and adjacent surface and underground water resources.250 It also
emits air pollutants, including hydrogen sulfide, ozone, and methane gas,
which are all highly toxic and carcinogenic.251 The release of greenhouse
241. Rebecca Clarren, Special Report: Poison Air at Sheep Camp, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 5,
2018), https://perma.cc/24CD-9EZT.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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gases from unused wells is actually a bigger contributor to climate change
than hydraulic fracturing.252 The contaminated water from uncapped wells
discharges widely, affecting the San Juan River and other rivers, which are
running low. The Four Corners region received less than half the normal
amount of moisture last winter.253
The environmental impacts of idle wells are known and documented.
In Red Valley, a sign actually warns of “Poison gases” in the vicinity of the
wells. According to federal policy, “abandoned wells” should be capped by
concrete and sealed when they are no longer in use, and the adjacent land
should be restored.254 However, the necessary environmental assessment
for abandoned wells and the actual well capping and remediation can cost
thousands or even hundreds of thousands of dollars, and most companies
will not willingly assume this cost.255 Furthermore, when oil and gas prices
are down, the companies save money by letting the wells go idle, only to be
reactivated when the prices rise.256
This is a national problem, of course, but the problem is particularly
compelling for Indian country. Many oil and gas wells in the United States
are on public lands managed by the BLM and other federal agencies257—
lands which are not inhabited. In comparison, oil and gas wells on tribal
lands are within the sovereign territory of Native nations and affect the
permanent homes and livestock range for tribal members.258 There is no
place for residents to move when the levels of poisonous gas rise, and in
most cases, they lack the resources to temporarily relocate as well. In short,
the environmental pollution caused by unused wells jeopardizes the health
of tribal members, and the environmental pollution contaminates air and
water resources, as well as the livestock that tribal members use for food
and subsistence.
Who is monitoring the problem? According to a 2015 report of the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), there is no comprehensive in-
ventory of oil and gas wells on tribal lands.259 In the San Juan basin alone,
there are more than 500 wells, and “possibly several thousand.”260 BLM is
responsible for monitoring oil and gas wells on most tribal lands, and yet
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. About the BLM Oil and Gas Program, United States Department of the Interior Bureau of Land
Management, (June 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/K45Z-88J8.
258. Clarren, supra note 241. R
259. Id.; Indian Energy Development: Poor Management by BIA Has Hindered Energy Development
on Indian Lands, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-502 at 22–24 (GAO 2015). SEE
COMMENT
260. Clarren, supra note 241. R
33
Tsosie: Tribal Data Governance
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2019
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-2\MON204.txt unknown Seq: 34  1-AUG-19 12:03
262 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 80
the agency does not have a comprehensive record of reviews conducted to
determine the number of active versus idle wells.261 The GAO and Interior
Department admit that the database used to identify idle wells is inaccurate
and incomplete, and the Agency lacks a clear strategy to review the
wells.262 One BLM official, who apparently spoke to the reporter under
conditions of anonymity, stated that the “agency routinely prioritizes
processing drilling permits over monitoring and encouraging companies to
plug and clean old wells.”263
So, who is looking out for the interests of tribal members? The BLM
officials are not required to visit inactive wells. Even when they do, they are
not required to conduct routine air, soil or water quality testing, and they
instead rely on “sight and smell” to determine if an inactive well is leaking
methane or other contaminants.264 One inspector stated that “Whether tribal
resources are protected really comes down to how loudly . . . a tribe advo-
cat[es] for themselves with BIA and BLM.”265 If the harm is not docu-
mented, then there is little that a tribe can do to require “compliance” with
prevailing pollution control limitations.
Tribal governments vary in their capacity to exercise adequate envi-
ronmental regulatory oversight, and data acquisition and management is
pivotal to any successful environmental regulatory program. The Navajo
Nation has its own Environmental Protection Agency,266 but still coordi-
nates regulatory oversight with the BIA and the BLM. The Southern Ute
tribal government created its own oil and gas corporation, Red Willow Pro-
duction Company, twenty-six years ago and took over management of
leases and regulatory responsibilities that were formerly under the authority
of the BIA and BLM.267 The Southern Ute Tribe maintains that this is more
protective and also affords economic gain to the tribe by ensuring that lease
revenues go back to the Tribe.268 The tribal government is invested in oil
and gas drilling enterprises throughout the country, and is exploring devel-
opment of the shale formation that underlies the reservation and has the
potential for 1,500 additional oil and gas wells.269
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See Id.
265. Id.
266. See Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change, Sustainability and Globalization: Charting the Future of
Indigenous Environmental Self-Determination, 4 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 188, 214 (2009).
267. Clarren, supra note 241. R
268. Id.; Catherine Traywick, A Tale of Two Tribes: Colorado’s Southern Utes Want to Drill as
Sioux Battle Pipeline, The Denver Post Oct. 15, 2016, https://perma.cc/B4PV-FTLN.
269. Clarren, supra note 241. R
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Finally, who is accountable for environmental harm once it is docu-
mented? Energy companies were required to post bonds before undertaking
development, but for oil and gas wells dating back several years, the bonds
are largely insufficient (maybe $8,000—which could be a blanket bond to
cover all wells). Many companies have since declared bankruptcy or dis-
solved their business.270 Thus, no one really has financial accountability or
even an estimate of what it would cost to restore reservation lands to their
former condition.
The situation with abandoned and unused oil and gas wells mirrors that
of abandoned uranium mines. As of 2015, there were over 500 known aban-
doned uranium mines on the Navajo Nation, and only a few dozen could
actually be linked to known owners for purposes of starting an investigation
into liability for clean-up.271 The Navajo Nation at that time lacked any
official access to the CERCLA Superfund because the sites were not for-
mally listed on the National Priorities List.272 Only one site, the Northeast
Church Rock site, was in the early stages of remediation, but it was unclear
where the heavily contaminated soil could be placed.273 The Navajo Nation
issued a moratorium on new uranium mining within reservation lands.274
However, the State of New Mexico authorized uranium mining on fee lands
within the checkerboard area using the newer “In situ” leach technology,
propounded as more “safe” but still posing a considerable environmental
risk to the aquifer which provides the only source of drinking water to tribal
members within the area.275 The population of the checkerboard area is
virtually all Navajo, and non-Indian owners use their fee lands for mining
and development and not for residential use.276
It is impossible to understand the current issues without reference to
the historical context of the problem. In the Southwest, tribal lands have
been used for over a century to feed the country’s appetite for cheap en-
ergy—mainly by exploitation of fossil fuels—as well as the demand for
nuclear weapons and energy. The environmental health consequences of
this development are severe and continue to grow as the infrastructure for
twentieth century energy development falls into decay, causing widespread
270. Id.
271. Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation: Redressing the Legacy of
Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and Native Lands, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 203
(2015); Brandon Loomis, Uranium Mine Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation Could Take 100 Years:
Uranium is Still a Threat, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 4, 2014, at A1.
272. Id. at 207–08;Uranium Contamination: Overall Scope, Time Frame, and Cost Information Is
Needed for Contamination Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-14-323 12 (GAO 2014).
273. Tsosie, supra note 271, at 208; Uranium Contamination, supra note 272, at 24. R
274. Tsosie, supra note 271, at 256; Uranium Contamination, supra note 272, at 12. R
275. Id.
276. Tsosie, supra note 271, at 224. R
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air and water pollution on tribal lands. However, rather than dealing with
the costs of remediation of abandoned mines, decaying pipelines, and idle
oil and gas wells, the federal agencies that oversee energy development
continue to prioritize the authorization of new oil and gas wells, and the
operation of energy resource extraction through new high pressure (hydrau-
lic fracturing) technologies that also have profound environmental and
health effects.
The net result of this gap in data and governmental action is that the
foundational systems of survival—land, water, food resources—are in jeop-
ardy and are increasingly vulnerable, given the drought conditions that ex-
acerbate the environmental impacts. Energy resource development and cli-
mate change have contributed to the perfect storm that exists in Indian
country. Poverty, underdevelopment, and political transition at the national
level have caused additional impacts. As this discussion indicates, no single
entity has the data to fully understand the problem, and there is no clear
mechanism to secure the data or deploy it for the benefit of tribal govern-
ments and their members. Indigenous data sovereignty is necessary but re-
quires careful thought as to how tribal data systems and structures will dif-
fer from the counterpart structures used by other governments.
For example, in relation to the Red Valley case study, the Navajo tribal
members are clearly suffering health impacts and have requested an envi-
ronmental assessment of the problem. They have requested this of the tribal
government, the BIA, and the BLM.277 Who should have the duty to re-
spond? What information should be gathered? Will the information include
health data from each of the residents? Once the data is gathered, who
should be entrusted to do the analysis and release the findings? What mech-
anisms exist to protect the information from misuse? Can tribal members
trust the tribal government to house, use, and manage the data? How about
the BIA or the BLM?
It is likely that the BLM and perhaps the BIA are primarily responding
to the current Administration’s views about environmental regulatory pri-
orities.278 The priorities of the Navajo Nation may be different. Tribal gov-
ernments can choose to align themselves with the dominant system’s ap-
proach, placing the emphasis upon economic benefit, or they can adopt their
own approach to ensure that community health and resilience are protected.
The final section of this article explores the importance of political and
cultural sovereignty to tribal data governance and effective intergovernmen-
tal coordination over data.
277. Clarren, supra note 241. R
278. For example, on Tuesday Dec. 11, 2018 BLM held an auction leasing 150,000 acres of land
near Utah’s Arches and Canyonlands national parks for fracking, posing significant risks to air and
water quality, as well as the protected wildlife and landscape of the national park areas.
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V. CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS DO?
Indigenous data sovereignty requires tribal governments to exercise
both their political sovereignty and their cultural sovereignty. In the United
States, federally-recognized tribal governments have specific legal rights by
virtue of their recognized political status. Both Chaney’s research and the
recent NCAI study indicate that tribal governments are taking action to ex-
ercise data sovereignty in several ways.279 Many tribal governments are
enacting laws authorizing certain types of tribal governmental databases,
for example, case management systems for tribal government personnel
dealing with child abuse cases, central data repositories for information on
violent crimes on the reservation, data pertaining to racial discrimination
against tribal members in border towns, data relevant to tribal culture, his-
tory and archaeological resources.280 Tribes are also passing laws dealing
with the manner and length of time that the data must be retained.281 Cha-
ney also cites tribal laws designed to secure data accuracy, for example, by
allowing tribal members to challenge the accuracy of data reported and in-
serted into a database.282 Many tribes have passed laws restricting dissemi-
nation of tribally-retained data, and some even provide penalties for unau-
thorized release of or access to data within tribal control.283 Finally, Chaney
cites tribes who have passed laws protecting data security and the integrity
of tribal databases.284
These are commendable actions in the exercise of political sover-
eignty. Indigenous data sovereignty, however, also requires the exercise of
cultural sovereignty. Many years ago, when I served on the Board of Direc-
tors of the Native American Rights Fund, I co-authored an article with my
fellow Board Member, Wallace Coffey, who was the long-time Chairman
of the Comanche Nation. We were dismayed about the United States Su-
preme Court’s increasingly narrow view about what powers tribal govern-
ments have by virtue of their “inherent sovereignty,” which equates to a
political view of permissible jurisdictional authorities. Instead, we advo-
cated for a vision of “cultural sovereignty” to give life to tribal inherent
sovereignty, which is the “effort of Indian nations and Indian people to
exercise their own norms and values to structure their collective futures.”285
We stated that each group’s cultural sovereignty comes from within, and it
279. Chaney, supra note 201, at 12. R
280. Id.
281. Id. at 12–13.
282. Id. at 13.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 21, at 196. R
37
Tsosie: Tribal Data Governance
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2019
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-2\MON204.txt unknown Seq: 38  1-AUG-19 12:03
266 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 80
is “up to Indian people to define, assert, protect, and insist upon respect for
that right.”286
Along with other tribal leaders and representatives, we later drew upon
the concept of cultural sovereignty to form the Working Group on Cultur-
ally Unidentified Human Remains, which advocated for repatriation of Na-
tive human remains that were not “culturally affiliated” to a contemporary
federally-recognized tribe for purposes of NAGPRA, and which were, at
that time, argued to be the “property” of the museum or agency that had
“custody” of the remains.287 At that time, there were thousands of Native
American human remains that were designated as “culturally unidentifi-
able,” often because museums and agencies had not retained the data neces-
sary to affiliate the remains with modern tribal governments, nor had they
undertaken the required consultations in order to “culturally affiliate” the
remains.288 Indigenous data sovereignty as cultural sovereignty turned out
to be pivotal to gain justice for Indigenous peoples and their ancestors.
Indigenous data sovereignty is powerfully linked to the dynamic of
cultural sovereignty. There is a great deal of information in libraries,
archives, and records of the state and federal governments about Indigenous
peoples. Federal agencies possess valuable data, often secured through re-
quired consultations with tribal governments about environmental and, or,
cultural resources pursuant to statutes such as the National Environmental
Policy Act and the National Historic Preservation Act.289 This information
can be used for beneficial purposes or for harmful purposes. It is vitally
important for Indigenous peoples to have a role at the decision-making ta-
ble, and therefore tribal governments have a powerful interest in the par-
ticipatory design of governance regimes for digital data.
The cultural sovereignty of Indigenous nations is rooted within each
nation and is not a product of overt recognition or acceptance by the nation-
state. This is clear with Native Hawaiian people, who continue to exercise
their cultural sovereignty to protect their lands, resources and culture, de-
spite the lack of federal recognition for their political sovereignty. Govern-
ance authority is enhanced when a tribal government has recognized politi-
cal sovereignty within the United States federal system, but cultural sover-
eignty dates from time immemorial, and it is always part of Indigenous
identity.
286. Id.
287. See generally Rebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA and the Problem of ‘Culturally Unidentifiable’ Human
Remains: The Argument for a Human Rights Framework, 44 ARIZ. ST.L.J. 809, 860 (2012).
288. Id.
289. The consultation requirement stems from the Federal government’s trust responsibility and is
reflected in various Executive Orders and statutory provisions. See Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict be-
tween the “Public Trust” and the “Indian Trust” Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native
Nations, 39 U. TULSA L. REV. 271, 285–88 (2003).
38
Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/4
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-2\MON204.txt unknown Seq: 39  1-AUG-19 12:03
2019 TRIBAL DATA GOVERNANCE 267
I will conclude this essay with some thoughts that were expressed at a
conference on cultural sovereignty that we organized at Arizona State Uni-
versity in 2002 as a dialogue for tribal leaders. One of our speakers was the
late Claudeen Bates-Arthur, who served as Attorney General for the Navajo
Nation and also served as the legal director of DNA Peoples’ Legal Ser-
vices. She was a graduate of the ASU College of Law and one of the first
Native American law graduates to be admitted to practice in Arizona. She
was a strong and inspirational leader, but also someone who spoke her truth
and dedicated her life to the people.
In order for tribal governments to take on the task of preservation of
sovereignty, Bates-Arthur said, tribes must have leaders with knowledge of
internal cultural sovereignty and, in addition, must have a vision of preser-
vation for the seventh generation.290 She encouraged us to be mindful of the
need to distinguish internal self-images from those that come in from the
outside to influence who we are now.291
That is really the vital force of traditional knowledge. Claudeen Bates-
Arthur spoke of the instructions that were received from the Holy People
who gave the Dine´ people their fundamental laws and philosophy.292 These
are the concepts that remain unchanged, despite the intrusions from the
outside, and they give the people their identity in each successive genera-
tion. They also give life, balance and harmony: “We know how to live and
survive as Navajo people because we were given instructions by the Holy
People and rules and laws were given for us to follow.”293
Tribal governments have an ownership interest in tribal data and tradi-
tional knowledge. They should be central participants in decision-making
about data sharing with state, local and federal governments, to the extent
necessary to effectuate the goals and interests of tribal governments and
their members, and also to implement the federal government’s trust re-
sponsibility to American Indian and Alaska Native Nations. State govern-
ments should be encouraged to give effect to tribal interests in exercising
data sovereignty based on something like the “sovereign-difference” princi-
ple that Professor Woods has advocated. A collaborative and equitable sys-
tem of data management is needed for the benefit of Indigenous peoples
and their members. It is also needed to produce a more just and inclusive
domestic government to serve the interests of all Indigenous peoples and
future generations.
290. Claudeen Bates Arthur, The Role of the Tribal Attorney, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 21, 24 (2002).
291. Id. at 21.
292. Id. at 23.
293. Id. at 25.
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